Techdirt wants to know what’s wrong with cable industry consolidation:
Because cable is geographically constrained, from a consumer perspective, all that matters is the market power my provider can exercise locally. If I’ve got three regional cable providers to choose from, it makes no difference whether two of them each hold a 40 percent national share. If I’ve got only one serving my area, the fact that it only controls 3 percent of the national market is similarly irrelevant. And if I’m in the latter boat, declaring that the largest firms with the most resources are forbidden to expand their operations into my neighborhood scarcely seems calculated to increase my access to alternatives. The FCC cites regional consolidation as a motive for the cap, but if cable providers are gunning for such regional monopolies, then won’t they divest first in the regions where they do face competition, and hold on to the areas where they’re the lone option?
There’s a certain element of truth to this, of course. In determining the price I pay for TV service, it matters little whether Comcast has 5% or 50% national market share. Comcast just raised my rates for cable service, but left their rates for phone and internet service the same. They face little competition in the Richmond market for TV service (FiOS is available in limited areas, but not at my house), but compete fiercely against Verizon for telephone and internet customers. The problem with Julian Sanchez’ thesis, however, is that if freed from the 30% cap, Time Warner or Cox would come into the market to provide cable competition. They wouldn’t, and in most places they can’t, due to local monopoly franchise contracts. What the cable companies would do is expand nationally via acquisition of smaller rivals, with TW and Comcast heading inexorably toward a cable duopoly. They have very little interest in competing against each other, mirroring the situation in telecom in 1996. Bell Atlantic, while hamstrung in its region, could have offered competitive service in the BellSouth or Ameritech regions, but they had absolutely no interest in doing so, to the detriment of consumers.
So if cable consolidation wouldn’t drive prices down, what’s the harm, given that cable companies already have local monopolies in many areas where IPTV or satellite isn’t an option? The harm isn’t horizontal market power expansion (going from 30% to 50% of the cable TV market), it’s vertical market power expansion. Time Warner already produces content through its myriad entertainment properties. Comcast owns E!, Versus (nee the Outdoor Life Network), the Golf Channel and G4, along with Comcast SportsNet regional networks in DC and Philadelphia. Comcast also has partial ownership interests in MGM, United Artists and the Philadelphia Flyers and 76ers. To the extent these cable giants get even bigger and squeeze out competitors, they have even more interest to play hardball, both keeping competing programming off their networks and refusing to provide their own programming to competitors.
This has already happened several times with regional sports programming. After the Baltimore Orioles started a network (MASN) to compete with Comcast SportsNet, the cable giant sued, and said that “we think in most sports markets in the country, that it’s more efficient and better for the customer to have a single regional sports network.” Similarly, Cablevision refused to carry the Yankees’ YES network after the team stopped selling cable rights to the MSG network (owned by Cablevision). When the Twins tried to start Victory One Sports, TW and other providers refused to carry it, killing the fledgling network.
So long as multiple cable providers exist, there’s far less incentive for such shenanigans, but if there are only one or two large providers, the incentive to withhold content from competitors increases, and makes it harder for competitors to establish themselves. Eventually, diversification and technology will win out, but in the short term, that’s one reason to fear consolidation.